In this paper, we study a contest between two teams. The teams include the same number of players. Each player of a team participates in a component battle, competing against a matched rival from the other team. A team wins if and only if its players prevail in su¢ ciently large number of component battles. We demonstrate in an all-pay-auction setting that the wellstudied "discouragement e¤ect"in individual multi-battle contests do not appear. Instead, the (stochastic) outcomes of past battles do not a¤ect the stochastic outcomes of future plays. In addition, the expected e¤ort of the contest is independent of the temporal structure of the contest, i.e., the sequencing or clustering of component battles, or the prevailing information disclosure and feedback policy. The analysis reveals the fundamental di¤erence in players' strategic mindsets between individual contests and team contests. These results yield rich implications on contest design and policy experimentation, and we show the main results and their logic remain valid under a wide array of alternative settings.
Introduction
Many competitive events can be generically viewed as contests. In such contests, economic agents expend scarce resources in order to win a limited number of prizes, while they forfeit the resources regardless of win or loss. This type of competitive activities appears in a diverse array of environments including political campaigns, sports, R&D races, warfare, and even internal labor markets inside …rms.
The widespread phenomenon has spawned a wide array of formal models that is dedicated to unveiling the various strategic concerns involved in these activities. This evolving literature has increasingly recognized that a contest often consists of more than a single static "battle"(see Konrad, 2009 ). Instead, it may require rivaling parties to confront each other on multiple fronts. One's success cannot be accomplished in a single stroke of e¤ort, but depends on its overall performance in a series of shots. Such multi-battle contests are not uncommon in real world. Consider, for instance, an R&D race towards the innovation of a …nal product (see Harris and Vickers, 1987) . The development e¤ort is often an accumulative process which proceeds in multiple stages. In each stage …rms compete on a speci…c task, i.e. the development of a component technology. A …rm attains its ultimate success only if it achieves a su¢ cient number of advances ahead of its rival. Alternatively, to stand out as a U.S. presidential candidate, a politician in primaries has to defeat his opponents in the majority of state elections (see Klumpp and Polborn, 2006) .
The existing studies have conventionally assumed that the grand prize of a multi-battle contest is contested by individual contenders, and that each of them participates in all component battles. Many contests, however, involve competitions between teams, in which each member of a team is matched to his counterpart from the rival team on an individual battle…eld. A team's success requires its team members to secure su¢ cient wins in component battles. A member of a team bene…ts from the win of the team in the overall contest, while each member of a team decides on his contribution in his own battle. For instance, major pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, such as Roche and L'Oréal, have evolved into network organizations that rely heavily on extensive webs of strategic alliances in R&D. In a race towards a new drug, component tasks of the development project are often carried out by a¢ liated but independent entities within each …rm's network. Each entity retains control over its own input on his own task. Political parties'competition in general elections also resembles team contests. A political party wins majority status only if its candidates prevail in a su¢ cient number of constituencies, while the success or failure of an individual candidate to a large extent depends on his own e¤ort in raising fund and campaigning. Alternatively, a large-scaled military operation usually includes a series of separate battles between matched individual units, e.g., in World War II. The outcome on an individual battle…eld depends on the maneuvers and commitments of the participating units. Such a contest can be most intuitively exempli…ed by many sports events. Many team titles, such as Davis Cup in men's tennis, Thomas Cup in men's badminton and Swaythling Cup in men's table tennis, are contested through a series of individual matches.
In team contests, one's payo¤ depends on not only the outcome of his own battle, but also the e¤ort contributed by his teammates. The strategic behavior of players naturally involves coordination and collective action. They face substantially di¤erent trade-o¤s than their counterparts in individual contests, which demands a drastically di¤erent strategic mindsets. The literature, however, has provided little in formal modelling to shed light on the widespread phenomenon.
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a multi-battle team contest. Two teams, comprised of an equal number of players, compete for a common object. Each player of a team competes against his matched opponent from the rival team in one component battle. These component battles are carried out successively. Each player observes the outcomes of previous battles and the current state of the grand contest before he sinks his outlays on the battle…eld. A player receives a positive reward from the win of his team, which is a public good, while he is also allowed to secure a private trophy from winning his own battle. To provide an analogy, a newly synthesized chemical could not only contribute to P&G's innovation on a grooming product, but also creates private bene…t to the a¢ liated lab that successfully develops this ingredient, i.e., royalty revenues from future alternative uses of the chemical. Alternatively, Novak Djokovic may attach substantial importance to his personal victory over Rafael Nadal even when he represents Serbian team in the …nal of Davis Cup. A politician who runs for parliament membership may bene…t even more from his individual success than from the majority status of his party. 1 Matched players on each battle…eld commonly value the private trophy. Its value, however, is speci…c to the particular battle…eld, and could vary across di¤erent battles. Players can be heterogenous in terms of their abilities. Their marginal e¤ort costs are drawn from possibly di¤erent distributions. They strategically decide how much e¤ort to contribute to maximize their own expected payo¤.
The results on team contests run in stark contrast to those from multi-battle contests between individuals, which reveals the fundamentally di¤erent incentives induced by team competitions as compared to individual contests. The conventional wisdom, e.g. Harris and Vickers (1987) , Klumpp and Polborn (2006) , Konrad and Kovenock (2009a) and Malueg and Yates (2010) , holds that a dynamic contest demonstrates a crucial feature of "historydependence": One's (perhaps purely accidental) victories in early battles generate strategic 1. History-Independence We show that the outcomes of early battles do not distort future confrontations. Throughout the contest, a player's probability winning his battle does not depend on the state of the contest, i.e., by how much one's team is leading or lagging behind the rival team, and how many additional wins each team needs to reach …nish line. The stochastic outcome of each battle, i.e., the ex ante likelihood of each player's win, is purely determined by participating players'e¤ort cost characteristics.
2. Sequence-Independence Let us …x the matching of players and let each battle be contested between a …xed pair of players. The battle would yield a …xed amount of ex ante expected overall e¤ort, which is independent of the order of the battle in the entire sequence either. The overall expected e¤ort of the contest, as well as its stochastic outcome, is invariable if the sequence of battles is reshu-ed.
3. Temporal-Structure-Independence (or Disclosure-Independence) The ex ante expected e¤ort of a battle between a …xed pair of players would not vary even when the battles of the contest, or a portion of the battles, are carried out simultaneously. So is its stochastic outcome. To interpret it alternatively, it also predicts that the expected e¤ort of the contest is independent of the prevailing information disclosure or feedback policy. The expected e¤ort and stochastic outcome of a battle, as well as those of the entire contest, do not vary no matter whether players observe the history of previous battles.
These results yield several useful implications for contest design and also practical policy experimentation. For brevity, we discuss them only in Section 5, after we present our formal analysis. The main logic is to be illustrated in Section 3 through a simple illustrative example. The logic that underpins our main results surface in the simpli…ed setting, which highlight the di¤ering strategic trade-o¤s involved in individual multi-battle contests and team contests, respectively.
In the rest of this section, we brie ‡y review the relevant literature. Section 2 sets up a general model of multi-battle contest between teams. In Section 3, we present a simple and stylized example. Section 4 conducts the main analysis. In Section 5, we discuss the main implications of our results, their robustness and the a few possible extensions. Section 6 concludes this paper.
Literature
This paper primarily belongs to the literature on multi-battle contests. This strand of literature dates back to Harris and Vickers (1987) . They analyze a dynamic R&D race where competing parties meet in a sequence of component contests successively, and one wins a prize if and only if it has won a su¢ cient number of them. Snyder (1989) , in contrast, studies a simultaneous multi-battle contest, which models the competition for majority status between two political parties in the parallel elections of multiple constituencies. Harris and Vickers (1987) are among the …rst to identify the discouragement e¤ect in a race. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) , as aforementioned, focus on U.S. presidential primaries and compare the e¢ ciency of sequential campaigning institution to that of its simultaneous counterpart. The analysis provides a rationale for the "New Hampshire E¤ect"observed in the history of primaries, and demonstrates the e¢ ciency e¤ect of sequential contest. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) model each component battle as a Tullock contest. Konrad and Kovenock (2009a) provide a complete account of sequential multi-battle contest with each component battle being a pairwise all-pay auction, where no exogenous noise contributes to players'winning odds in each battle. In contrast to many other studies, the framework of Konrad and Kovenock (2009a) allows the players to be asymmetric in various aspects, e.g., their bidding costs, the minimum numbers of battles to win for victory in the contest, etc. Konrad and Kovenock (2010) demonstrate that the aforementioned discouragement e¤ect can be attenuated when the two players' bidding costs are ex ante uncertain. Malueg and Yates (2010) show theoretically the ex post asymmetry caused by one's winning early battle in a best-of-three contest between two symmetric players. They further provide empirical evidence from professional tennis matches.
These studies typically assume that players meet each other in disjoint battle…elds. Kovenock, Sarangi, and Wiser (2011) introduce interdependence between component battles by allowing for "complementarity": A contestant wins the contest if he wins certain combination of component battles. Kovenock and Roberson (2009) study a two-stage contest. In each stage, contestants meet each other in multiple parallel battles, and one's win on one battle…eld at the …rst stage grants him a head-start when they meet again on the same front.
Our paper di¤ers from these studies by studying team contest, in which each component battle is contested by a particular pair of matched players from rival teams. The main questions raised in this paper are analogous to those of Klumpp and Polborn (2006) , i.e.
(1) How the outcomes of early battles distort those of later ones; and (2) How di¤ering temporal structures a¤ect contestants'behaviors. The present study, however, focuses on a di¤erent setup from Klumpp and Polborn (2006) . The results thus have a di¤erent scope of applications. For instance, our analysis could shed light on the strategic trade-o¤s and e¢ cient design of a national general election where the candidate in each constituency plays an active role on behalf of his political party. In contrast, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) focus on U.S. primaries where individual contenders compete in all states. Our paper complements that of Klumpp and Polborn (2006) in this aspect. Strumpf (2002) focus on the distortionary e¤ect of the particular sequence of heterogenous battles on the outcome of the multi-battle sequential contest. He shows that a player who is favored in later battles is more likely to prevail than one who is favored in early contentions. Similar to Klumpp and Polborn (2006) , Strumpf (2002) focuses on contests between individuals, and also interpret his analysis in the context of presidential primaries. Our setup also di¤ers from that of Strumpf (2002) in this regard. Our setting leads to the Sequence-Independence result, which is unique in team contest setting.
Our paper is naturally linked to the literature on group contest or contest between allied players. This extensive literature includes Skaperdas (1998), Nitzan (1991) Konrad and Kovenock (2009b) , among many others. These studies typically assume that contestants in each coalition join force on a single front to produce composite output. In contrast, our setting requires each player to carry out his part on a single front, and matched players compete against each on a set of disjoint battles. A few notable exceptions are more closely related to our paper, including Kovenock and Roberson (2010) and Rietzke and Roberson (2010) . These two studies consider rivalry between two allied players and one independent player. Each of the former competes against the latter in a series of simultaneous component battles in a Colonel Blotto games. The two studies investigate the incentives of allied players to exchange their resources, and the subsequent strategic plays in the contests. Our paper di¤er from them fundamentally in a several aspects. First, a player in their settings …ghts a series of parallel battles (as given by the nature of Colonel Blotto games), while one in ours does only one. Second, a player in their settings secures rent from winning each component battle: He maximizes the sum of his private payo¤s from all his battles, but he does not receive spillover from his ally's win or loss. In contrast, a player in our setting derives utility from his team's winning the majority of battles, but may not receive private reward from winning their own battles. Third, players in their contexts form alliance to exchange resource, while players in our setting contribute to the teams by winning their own battles.
Our analysis concludes that the expected e¤ort of the team contest does not dependent on whether players learn the outcomes of previous battle. The paper can thus be linked to the small but growing literature on communication and feedback in dynamic contests. This strand of literature, e.g., Gershkov and Perry (2009), Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), Gürtler and Harbring (2010) , and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), typically focuses on whether a contest designer should reveal intermediate rankings to the contestants in a dynamic contest. In contrast to the present paper, players in these studies compete on single tasks, and supply continuing ‡ow of e¤orts. The winner is determined by players'accumulated output, instead of their accumulated numbers of wins in discrete battles.
Our paper yield immediate implications on the design of election schemes. The paper is thus marginally linked to the literature on sequential elections. Except for the few notable exceptions such as Klumpp and Polborn (2006) and Strumpf (2002) , most of these studies concern themselves with the behavior of voters. For instance, Dekel and Piccione (2000) focus on sophisticated voters'strategic information gathering activities. Bikhchandani, Hirshlefer and Welch (1992) study the information cascades in primaries, and their model depict the herding behavior of voters in later states.
Sequential Multi-Battle Team Contest: Setup
Two teams, indexed by i = 1; 2, compete in a contest for an indivisible object. Each team consists of 2n + 1 players, where n is a positive integer. Players of a team i are indexed by i(t), with t 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g. The two teams compete against each other on 2n + 1 disjoint battle…elds. Each player 1(t) of team 1 is matched to his counterpart 2(t) of the rival team in a pairwise component battle t. A team is awarded the object if and only if its players accumulate at least n + 1 victories in these component battles.
It should be noted that our analytical results do not depend on the ex ante symmetry between the two teams. We discuss in Section 5 that all results extend to an alternative setting where teams face asymmetric "…nish lines". That is, one team can prevail by winning a smaller number of component battles.
Temporal Structures
The 2n + 1 component battles are carried out successively. Before an arbitary battle t is fought, the history of past battles, or the state of the contest, is observed by players 1(t) and 2(t). The state of the contest is summarized by a tuple (k; l), where k is the number of wins secured by team 1 and l is that of team 2, with k + l + 1 t under a sequential contest.
The contest reaches a terminal state (k; l) once one team has accumulated exactly n + 1 victories before the other does, i.e., max(k; l) = n + 1. In this case, subsequent battles are irrelevant for the outcome of the team contest. A component battle t is called trivial if the contest is in a state (k; l), with max(k; l) n + 1. However, players may still put forth positive e¤orts if they derive private bene…t from winning their own battles, which will be elaborated upon in more detail when we lay out the fundamentals about the payo¤ structure.
In Section 5, we present formal analysis of an alternative setting in which all or a subset of component battles are contested simultaneously.
Payo¤s
The reward to each player arises out of two sources: team prize and private prizes. First, one bene…ts from his team's win. The trophy of the winning team is a public good to its players. All players equally value the prize awarded to the team, and we normalize the common valuation to one. Second, players reap private bene…t from the win of his own battle, irrespective of his team's success or failure. The winner of a component battle t receives an individual prize t 0. The private prize purse t is speci…c to the particular battle…eld t. It varies across di¤erent battle…elds, while it is equally valued by the two players who vie for it. 2 In the case of t > 0, each trivial battle, i.e., a battle in a state (k; l)
with max(k; l) n + 1, is no di¤erent from a standard static contest in which two players compete for the single prize t . In the event of t = 0, each trivial battle is irrelevant as it elicits no e¤ort.
Component Contests
In each component battle t, the two matched players simultaneously exert their e¤orts x i(t Players can be heterogenous in terms of their competence, which is measured by the di¤ering marginal e¤ort costs. Each player i(t) bears a constant marginal cost c i(t) > 0 for his e¤ort entry x i(t) , with c i(t) to be distributed over a non-degenerate interval [c i(t) ; c i(t) ] 2 (0; +1) continuously and independently, according to a cumulative distribution function F i(t) (c i(t) ). The distribution functions, F i(t) (c i(t) )s, and their supports are common knowledge. The exact realization of c i(t) is known to player i(t).
The framework can ‡exibly accommodate a variety of information structures. To the extent that the realization of c i(t) is known to player i(t) himself but not to his rival, 8i 2 f1; 2g, the component battle t is a standard incomplete-information all-pay auction (see Moldovanu and Sela, 2001 , and Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2007 , with (possibly) ex ante asymmetric players. To the extent the realizations of both c 1(t) and c 2(t) are commonly known, the battle t is a standard complete-information all-pay auction (see Hillman and Riley, 1989 , Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1996, and Konrad and kovenock, 2009a and 2010). To the extent that the realization of c i(t) is commonly known, while that of c j(t) is learnt by player j(t) only, 8i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6 = j, the setting evolves into an all-pay auction with one-sided asymmetric information. 5 We show in the general analysis that our results do not depend on the prevailing information structure.
Some Additional Terminologies
Let p i (k; l) denote the probability of team i's eventual win assessed when the contest is in an arbitrary state (k; l). Players of a team i thus expect a team payo¤ v i (k; l) = 1 p i (k; l) from the prospect of winning the team prize, when the contest enters a state (k; l). We hereafter name the team payo¤ v i (k; l) the continuation value of team i evaluated at a state (k; l). Apparently, we must have v 1 (k; l) = 1 if k n + 1, and
3 It should be noted that the main claims of this paper are not limited to all-pay-auction setting. We adopt this popular form of contest technologies mainly for the sake of expositional e¢ ciency. As will be revealed by the illustrative examples in Section 3, the logic of our main results relies little on the prevailing winner selection mechanism. 4 Additional quali…cations are required for the zero-probability event that both players bid zero e¤orts.
Please refer to the proof of Lemma 2 for detail. 5 A similar contest is studied by Münster and Morath (2010) .
3 Illustrative Example: Symmetric "Best-of-Three"Con-
test
We now present a simple "best-of-three" example to highlight the unique characteristics of team contests. We …rst set up a benchmark contest, in which two players meet in successive battles and one wins by winning two of them. We then present its team-contest counterpart and compare the predictions of the two settings. Much of the logic that underpins our main results can be revealed in the simple setting.
In each component battle, players simultaneously commit to their e¤ort outlays. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all players bear a unity marginal e¤ort cost, which is commonly known. Further, we assume for the moment that players do not receive intermediate reward for winning a component battle. As mentioned in Section 2, the main logic of this paper does not rely on speci…c contest technologies. For the moment, we only require the winner selection mechanism of each battle to be symmetric: One is more likely to prevail if and only if he supplies strictly more e¤ort than the other. A symmetric bidding equilibrium is assumed to exist for symmetric players, i.e., when they are equally competent and equally motivated. In a symmetric equilibrium, players exert the same e¤ort and each wins with a probability 
Benchmark: Individual Contest
The benchmark contest resembles the "best-of-three" contest of Malueg and Yates (2010) . Two individual players, indexed by i = 1; 2, compete for a prize of value one. In each of the battles, players simultaneously exert their e¤ortx i(t) , wheret indicates the order of the battle.
The game can be analyzed by backward induction. Suppose that they each have won one battle. The outcome of the subsequent battle determines the ultimate winner. The deciding battle is apparently a symmetric match. Each player's ex ante expected payo¤ from participating in the last battle is given byṽ 3 = 1 2 x 3 , wherex 3 is the symmetric expected equilibrium e¤ort each player exerts in the battle.
We then consider players'incentives in the second battle. When battle 2 is to be fought, one player has won one (the …rst) battle. Without loss of generality, we assume that player 1 is the leader. Let~ i(t) (x 1(t) ;x 2(t) ) denote a player i's probability of winning battlet under a given e¤ort pro…le (x 1(t) ;x 2(t) ). He choosesx 1(2) to maximize his expected payo¤
By contrast, player 2, who would lose the entire contest if he loses the second battle, chooses
It is straightforward to see that player 1, as the leader, is better incentivized and becomes a favorite in the battle: His e¤ective prize spread, i.e., the di¤erence between the payo¤ if he wins, and that if he loses, amounts to (1 ṽ 3 ) > 1 2 , while that of his rival is onlyṽ 3 < 1 2
. The ex ante symmetric contest is diverted into an asymmetric path after one obtains a lead. As a result, player 1 is more likely to win the second battle simply because he has accidentally won the …rst.
(Sequential) Team Contests
We now demonstrate that the ex post asymmetry does not loom large in a team contest. Two teams, each consisting of three players, compete for a prize, which is a public good and has a value of one to all players in a team. Suppose that two teams score evenly in the …rst two battles. Battle 3 is apparently an even one. In the symmetric equilibrium, each player wins the deciding battle with a probability of 1 2 . We then look into the immediately preceding battles. The state of the contest when battle 2 takes place can be either (1; 0) or (0; 1). Assume without loss of generality that player 1(1) has won battle 1 on behalf of team 1.
Let i(t) (x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ) denote a player i's probability of winning battle t under a given e¤ort pro…le (x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ). In the second battle, player 1(2) chooses his e¤ort x 1(2) to maximize his expected payo¤
Player 1(2) would expect a return of exactly 1 if the team contest ends after his own battle, i.e. v 1 (2; 0) = 1. However, he expects a return, i.e., the continuation value v 1 (1; 1), of exactly 1 2 if he loses the battle and have it proceed into a deciding battle. This fact reveals the key di¤erence between the team contest and its individual counterpart. In the benchmark, player 1 expects an expected payo¤ of only 1 2 x 3 from losing battle 2 and being forced to …ght battle 3. Player 1(2), however, would not invest costly input in battle 3, while he stands a chance of 1 2 to win the team prize of 1. As a result, (3) can be rewritten as
Player 2(2) would end up with nothing if he loses the battle, while he also expects a return of 1 2 if he wins and the contest enters a state (1; 1): His teammate is expected to win the even battle with a probability of 1 2 . That is, v 2 (2; 0) = 0 and v 2 (1; 1) = 1 2 . He then chooses her e¤ort x 2(2) to maximize her expected payo¤
Functions (4) and (5) verify that player 2(2) values his win as much as his rival 1(2) does. Battle 2 remains symmetric in spite of team 1's lead. Each player is expected to win with a probability of 1 2 . One's initial lead does not distort subsequent battles.
Intuition
The simple example reveals the strikingly di¤erent strategic mindsets across the two environments. To illuminate its logic, let us …rst elaborate on the nature of the conventionally held discouragement e¤ect in individual sequential contests.
For a laggard in the "best-of-three"individual contest, the bene…t of winning the second battle is to even the score. Actual reward, however, would not accrue unless he wins the subsequent battle. He is disincentivized by two factors. First, the uncertainty of future battle discounts the incentive provided by the prize purse. Second, he has to continue to sink costly e¤ort in future battle if he wins the current one. The additional outlay dissipates his future rent, thereby attenuating his incentive to remain in contest. As evidenced by (2) , his incentive to win battle 2 is given by 1 2 x 3 . By contrast, the incentive of his leading opponent to win is magni…ed by two factors. First, he would reap the actual bene…t immediately if he wins. Second, the contest would be prolonged if he loses, which forces him to endure another uncertain and costly battle in future. The additional outlay burns his rent and therefore aggravates the pain from the current loss. As evidenced by our example, he receives 1 if he wins, while he ends up with only 1 2 x 3 if he loses. In summary, the leader has more to win and also more to lose, which makes him a favorite, despite their ex ante symmetry.
The same, however, cannot be said of team contests. We …rst consider the player of the leading team who is up for battle 2. Analogous to individual contests, the win allows him to secure the actual prize immediately. The lead, however, allows him to slack o¤: His team would not lose the contest immediately because of his loss and he can still receive the prize as long as his teammate prevails. He su¤ers less from a prolonged struggle than his counterpart in individual contests, because subsequent battle does not require his own contribution. His stake in the current battle is thus suppressed by these e¤ects. As evidenced by (3) and (4), a loss renders v 1 (1; 1) = 1 2 : The third battle is an e¤ortless fair draw. He would be punished less than his counterpart in individual contests as he free-rides on other's e¤ort.
We then consider the player of the lagging team who is up for battle 2. Analogous to his counterpart in individual contests, his valuation of the win is discounted by the future uncertainty caused by the lag, because he receives the prize only if his team also wins battle 3. However, as he does not have to bear the cost of future battle, the rent from the win will not be dissipated by the subsequent struggle when the contest continues. He expects a value of v 2 (1; 1) = 1 2 from his own win, which pays o¤ more to him than to his counterpart in individual contests. Furthermore, the disadvantage is a double-edged sword that also incentivizes him in a team contest. In contrast to his leading rival, the player in a lagging team is prevented from free-riding on his teammate because the loss would end the contest immediately. These e¤ects thus ampli…es his e¤ective "prize spread" in his battle, i.e.,
As a result, battles remain symmetric over all possible paths. We subsequently demonstrate that the result in a more generalized setting and compute the solution to the equilibrium. The logic revealed in the simple example carries over the more general setting.
General Analysis
We now execute our main analysis in a generalized "best-of-(2n+1)"sequential team contest. Consider an arbitrary battle t, and suppose that the contest enters an arbitrary state (k; l) with k; l < n + 1 and k + l + 1 t. We explore their strategic incentives in the battles. Player 1(t) chooses his e¤ort x 1(t) to maximize
Similarly, player 2(t)'s expected payo¤ obtains as
In the rest of this section, we present our analysis and discuss our results in three segments.
History-Independence
We now claim that (6) and (7) again allude to a symmetric battle, in which the two players equally value the win, i.e.
, regardless of the current state or the history of past plays. The following simple fact illuminates the entire puzzle.
; l 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g, with k + l 2n + 1.
The simple fact of Lemma 1 does not require a formal proof. Recall that the continuation value v 1 (k; l) at a state (k; l) is simply given by v 1 (k; l) = p 1 (k + 1; l) 1, where p 1 (k + 1; l) is team 1's winning likelihood assessed at a state (k; l). The continuation value to a player i(t) is simply the payo¤ from team prize after being discounted by the probability of his team's eventual victory. The team prize, however, must be won by either of the two teams. The outcome of a battle shifts the state of the contest, which changes the stochastic division of future rent, while it does not change the overall size of the rent.
By Lemma 1, player 2(t)'s stake on the battle can be reformulated as
which is the exactly the same as that for player 1(t). The following obtains.
Theorem 1 Every battle t, with t 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g is a common-valued all-pay auction in which the two matched players, 1(t) and 2(t), equally value the win. In the battle t, each player has an e¤ective prize spread
Theorem 1 generalizes the insights we obtain from the "best-of-three"example. A player's valuation of winning his own battle depends on the state of the contest. However, the shift of state impacts matched players symmetrically. Equally-valued battles ensue over all possible paths.
In our model, matched players are allowed to be ex ante heterogenous, with their e¤ort costs to be drawn from di¤erent distributions. As stated in Section 2, our setup allows for various information structures. Each player's e¤ort cost can be either known to himself only or commonly known. The existing literature has provided a complete account of asymmetric all-pay auctions with complete information. In Appendix we characterize formally the monotone equilibria of asymmetric common-valued all-pay auctions with either two-sided asymmetric information or one-sided asymmetric information.
Let us summarize the stochastic outcome of an arbitrary two-player all-pay auction by the tuple ( ; 1 ), which indicates that player 1 wins with a probability , while the other wins with a probability 1 . Our analysis yields the following important, although less than surprising property, which holds under all possible information structures.
Lemma 2 Consider a two-player common-value all-pay auction in which players both value the prize for v > 0. Its stochastic outcome in equilibrium is given by the tuple ( ; 1 ), with (c 1 ; c 2 ; F 1 (c 1 ); F 2 (c 2 )). Players' expected e¤orts are linear in the prize purse v, i.e.,
) is a function of players'cost characteristics.
Proof. See Appendix. Lemma 2 states that each player's equilibrium winning likelihood in a common-value all-pay auction is determined purely by players'e¤ort cost conditions, i.e., their exact e¤ort costs, and/or their distributions, depending on the prevailing information structure. Recall by Theorem 1 players in each battle symmetrically value their win, regardless of the state of the contest. The probability of a player i(t)'s winning battle t, according to Lemma 2, must depend on his and his rival's e¤ort cost conditions only. The bidding equilibrium, as well as the winning probability and the expected e¤ort i (c 1 ; c 2 ; F 1 (c 1 ); F 2 (c 2 ))v, can be solved for explicitly when players'cost conditions are speci…cally laid out.
Combining Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we obtain the following main result immediately.
Theorem 2 (History-Independence) Consider an arbitrary nontrivial battle t in state (k; l) with k; l n, and k + l + 1 t. Player 1(t) wins with a probability t , with t (c 1(t) ; c 2(t) ; F 1(t) (c 1(t) ); F 2(t) (c 2(t) )), and player 2(t) wins with the complementary probability 1 t . The stochastic outcome of the battle ( t ; 1 t ) does not depend on the state of the contest (k; l).
By Theorem 1, the entire contest can be viewed ex ante as a series of independent draws. The stochastic outcome of each component battle ( t ; 1 t ) is pre-determined by the pro…les of contenders'competence, and remains invariant regardless of the actual path of the contest. So is the stochastic outcome of the entire contest. The history of past battles does not distort the outcomes of future battles, although players'equilibrium outlays are contingent on the exact state of the contest.
These results are remarkably robust, and the main logic extends to much broader setting. First, Theorem 1, which predicts the constantly symmetric valuations between matched players, is completely independent of prevailing contest technologies. Second, the results of history-independence would continue to hold even when players are allowed to value their team's win unequally. In Section 5 we discuss such an extension. The counterparts of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 would be formulated alternatively, but the main logic leads to equivalent predictions.
Sequence-Independence
The history-independence property allows us to compute explicitly each team's continuation values v i (k; l) at all possible states, and the expected e¤ort of each battle. Thanks to Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we can focus explicitly on Team 1. For expositional e¢ ciency, we introduce the following terminology.
In a nontrivial battle t (or a trivial battle with t > 0), a player 1(t) prevails with a probability t . Let us de…ne 1 (hj m)j t+m 1 t , with t 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 2 mg, the probability of players 1(t) to 1(t+m 1)'s winning exactly h of the m non-trivial battles. The probability 1 (hj m)j t+m 1 t can be computed explicitly when players' cost conditions are available for battles t to t + m 1. We illustrate the property of 1 (hj m)j t+m 1 t with the following example.
Example 1 We consider a team contest between two 13-player teams. Assume for simplicity that each component battle is a complete-information all-pay auction, in which the realization of each player i(t)'s marginal e¤ort cost is common knowledge. Assume for simplicity c 1(t) = 1, and c 2(t) = c t 1, 8 t 2 f1; : : : ; 13g. By the well-known results in contest literature, each nontrivial component battle t has a stochastic outcome ( ). We compute 1 (2j 3)j 4 2 , the probability of team 1's winning exactly 2 component battles among battles 2-4. Team 1 may win any of the three combination of two battles and lose the rest: (2; 3); (2; 4); (3; 4): Hence, this probability can be computed as follows:
Based on the notations, the following general formula can be obtained for team 1's continuation value v 1 (k; l) evaluated at a given state (k; l). Once a contest enters a state (k; l), with k; l < n + 1, team 1 can secure its victory by …ghting at least another n + 1 k battles, which allows it rival team to win no additional battle.
Theorem 3 Suppose that a battle t is to be carried out when the contest is in a state (k; l), with k + l + 1 t. The continuation value of team 1 in this state (k; l) can be expressed as the follows:
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider the special case of symmetric team contest, in which all battles are perfectly symmetric. That is, the e¤ort costs of matched players are drawn from the same nondegenerate distributions in incomplete-information all-pay auction with two-sided asymmetric information, or they bear the same e¤ort costs in complete-information all-pay auction. The winner of each battle would be fairly drawn, with 1(t) = 2(t) = 1 2 , for all t 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g. We then obtain the following.
Corollary 1 In a symmetric team contest, the continuation value of team 1 when the contest is in an arbitrary state (k; l) is expressed as the follows:
These results allow us to compute explicitly the e¤ective prize spread of each player in a battle t at an arbitrary state (k; l), i.e.,
t, the prize spread for the battle t, i.e.,
t+1 if k; l n and min(m; l) < n;
By Theorem 4, in addition to the private prize t , winning the current battle at a state (k; l), with min(k; l) < n, would provide a marginal bene…t of
t+1 is simply the ex ante probability of the event that player 1(t)'s teammates win exactly n k out of the next 2n k l battles after battle t has been contested, while team 2 winning n l out of them, conditionally on that all these battles are nontrivial. In that event, battle t is critical to the entire contest, as its outcome would ex post break the tie and determine the winning team.
This …nding yields interesting implications, and sheds light on the nature of a team contest. Winning the current battle allows player 1(t) to derive additional bene…t from the team prize if and only if this battle turns out to be a tie-breaker or it is ex post critical: His win does not ex post contribute to the team's ultimate victory, to the extent that his teammates turn out to win more than n k out of them, while it does not pay o¤ (in terms of team prize) either to the extent that they turn out to secure less than n k out of them. This observation explains the logic of Theorem 1. A team's lead may disincentive its players and encourage them to free ride, as their battles are less likely to be critical, and their own loss can be made up for by others' wins. By contrast, a team's lags may incentivize its players to some extent, as their battles can be more likely to contribute to team's win, while they are less able to rely on the e¤orts of their teammates to remedy their own losses.
Again, the general formula allows us to obtain the following result for the special case of symmetric team contest.
Corollary 2 Consider a symmetric team contest, in which each pair of matched players are homogenous. At a state (k; l) with k + l + 1 t, the e¤ective prize spread for the battle t,
if k; l n and min(m; l) < n; (ii) t + 1 if k = l = n; (iii) t if max(k; l) n + 1.
Theorem 4 and
We now compute the ex ante expected e¤ort a battle t between the given pair of players 1(t) and 2(t). Let Pr( (k; l)j t), with k + l + 1 t, be the ex ante probability of the event that the battle t takes place in a state (k; l). Further, de…ne x t x 1(t) + x 2(t) , which denotes the overall e¤ort of battle t. We can then write the ex ante expected e¤ort of the battle as the follows:
The expected total e¤ort of the entire contest thus amounts to P 2n+1
The following thought experiment is considered. Fix the pairwise match between players. Then we reorder these battles between …xed pairs of players, and compare the resultant ex ante expected e¤orts of the contest under di¤ering sequences. De…ne t 1(t) (c 1(t) ; c 2(t) ; F 1(t) (c 1(t) ); F 2(t) (c 2(t) )) + 2(t) (c 1(t) ; c 2(t) ; F 1(t) (c 1(t) ); F 2(t) (c 2(t) )). The following can be concluded immediately.
Theorem 5 (Sequence-Independence) (i) A battle t between a …xed pair of players has a stochastic outcome ( t ; 1 t ), which is independent of the sequence of the entire contest.
(ii) Each battle t elicits an ex ante expected e¤ort
where 1 (nj 2n)j t is the overall probability of player 1(t)'s teammates' winning exactly n out of the 2n battles. The ex ante expected e¤ort of a battle between a …xed pair of players does not change when the battles are reshu-ed. So is the expected total e¤ort of the contest.
Theorem 5 states that neither the stochastic outcome of a battle between a …xed pair of players, nor its ex ante expected e¤ort depends on the sequence of these battles. Theorem 5 (i) somewhat trivially re-interprets the History-Independence result. The stochastic outcome ( t ; 1 t ) depends on players'cost conditions only. The general formula allows us to obtain the expected e¤ort in a symmetric contest, in which each battle is contested by symmetric players.
Corollary 3
In a symmetric battle, each battle t elicits an ex ante expected e¤ort
Indeed, players' e¤ort outlays in a battle would be contingent on the exact state of the contest. However, the ex ante expected e¤ort, which takes into account all possible contingencies a pair of players may face ex post, would remain independent of the order of battles. As stated by Theorem 5, the ex ante expected e¤ort is determined entirely by the e¤ort cost conditions of the matched players (which determine t ), the private prize of the battle, and the cost conditions of other players (which determine 1 (nj 2n)j t ).
Temporal-Structure-Independence
In this part, we relax our assumption of sequential contest and explore the rami…cations of alternative temporal structures. We allow component battles to be carried out (partially) simultaneously. The entire contest, with 2n + 1 component battles, is partitioned into Z 2n + 1 clusters. Battles included in the same cluster are carried out simultaneously. Players in each battle cannot observe the outcomes in parallel battles within the same cluster, while they observe the history of battles contested in previous clusters. This setup accommodates various possible temporal structures. When z = 2n + 1, the sequential setting we consider in the baseline setting is restored. With z = 1, a perfectly simultaneous setting obtains in which all battles are contested at the same time. We obtain the following.
Theorem 6 (Temporal-Structure-Independence) (i) Each battle t has a stochastic outcome ( t ; 1 t ), which is pre-determined by the distributions of their e¤ort costs, but is independent of the history of prior battles or the temporal structure of the contest.
(ii) Each battle t yields an ex ante expected overall e¤ort E(x t ) = t t + t 1 (nj 2n)j t , which is independent of the temporal structure.
Neither t nor t , nor 1 (nj 2n)j t would depend on the prevailing temporal structure of the contest. Theorem 6 is in fact a direct extension and generalization of Theorem 2 and 5. Regardless of the temporal structure, the winner of each battle is an independent draw, with the probability of one's winning to be pre-determined by players'cost conditions. By Theorem 6(ii), the team prize lures a …xed pair of players to contribute an expected e¤ort t 1 (nj 2n)j t , where t is determined purely by the characteristics of the players.
The team prize is further discounted by 1 (nj 2n)j t , which, as previously stated, is the probability of the event that player 1(t)'s teammates'winning exactly n nontrivial battles. In other words, this is the probability of the event that battle t turns out be critical. Hence, the ex ante expected e¤ort of the battle is independent of its order in the entire series, the temporal structure of the contest, or the information available to the players about other battles when committing to their outlays! Theorem 6 further elucidates the nature of team contest and the incentive it creates. A player's e¤ort would ex post pay o¤ (in terms of team prize) if and only if he engages in a deciding battle, and his e¤ort determines the win or loss of the entire contest. Consider a battle t, which is clustered with a few other battles. As revealed by our proof, a player i(t), when the contest is in a state (k; l), with k; l < n + 1, would respond to an e¤ective prize spread t + 1 (n kj 2n k l)j t;>k+l . The expression 1 (n kj 2n k l; (k; l))j t;>k+l depicts the probability of team 1's winning exactly n k out of the 2n k l nontrivial battles after the contest enters a state (k; l), excluding battle t itself, i.e., all the battles that are carried out simultaneously with t or subsequent to t, with the winner of each battle t 0 to be picked in an independent draw according to ( t 0 ; 1 t 0 ). It again refers to the event that battle t is ex post decides the winning team. The temporal structure does not vary the fundamental trade-o¤s faced by players.
Discussions and Extensions
Our results yield rich implications for the design of various competitive mechanisms. In this part, we brie ‡y discuss the implications and applications of our results. Further, our results and the main logic would continue to hold (qualitatively) in many alternative settings. We then discuss the robustness of our results in alternative contexts.
Implications and Applications
One straightforward application of our results is the design of team sports tournaments, e.g., Davis Cup (men's tennis) and Thomas Cup (men's badminton). In these events, players are sorted according to their professional rankings within each team. Then each player is matched to his counterpart from the rival team. Given the …xed matching of players between the two teams, it leaves open the question of how to sequence the matches between di¤erent (…xed) pairs of players. For instance, in the Davis Cup …nal, Rafael Nadal and Novak Djokovic, the top players of Spanish and Serbian National Teams, respectively, are set to meet. Should the match between Rafael Nadal and Novak Djokovic, the most exciting confrontation, be scheduled for an early round or a later round? Our Sequence-Independence result nevertheless indicates that the ex ante expected e¤ort of a match between a given pair of players does not depend on its order in the sequence. Furthermore, the temporal-structureindependence result points out that the expected e¤ort in these tournaments would not vary even if matches are to be contested (partially) simultaneously.
More importantly, the analysis allows us to address policy concerns. For instance, how does the temporal arrangement of an election a¤ect the outcome of the election, and the strategic behaviors of candidates? Consider, for instance, a policy designer, who attempts to economize on campaign expenditures in political races, and one natural instrument is to …ne-tune the timings of the elections in di¤erent constituencies. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) explore the e¢ ciency implications of temporal arrangement in individual multi-battle contests, i.e., U.S. presidential primaries. They show that a sequential multi-battle individual contest, e.g. the arrangement of U.S. Primaries, leads to lesser campaign expenditures than the arrangement of a "national election day" (a simultaneous contest), due to the aforementioned discouragement e¤ects. Players dump more resources on early elections, while they give up in later ones as lags accumulate.
Our analysis of team contests also addresses such policy concerns. In most of democracies, partisan politics in national general elections resemble a simultaneous multi-battle team contests. 6 Regional candidates, who represent rival political parties in each constituency, compete head-to-head for seats in national legislative body. Votes are cast on the election day across all constituencies. The party that achieves majority status in legislative body forms the government. In U.S., the election of house representatives has a simultaneous temporal arrangement, while the election for senate has a partially sequential structure. One third of the seats in U.S. Senate are up for election every other year, while all elections for these seats are carried out simultaneously. Would campaign expenditures be reduced if elections in di¤erent constituencies are carried out successively? Under a (partially) sequential race, e.g., election for Senate in U.S., would a party's lead distort the outcomes of subsequent elections? Our analysis immediately sheds light on the rami…cations of the di¤ering temporal arrangements. Our analysis suggests that the temporal structure of partisan elections in di¤erent constituencies do not cause distortion to either their outcomes or the expected rent dissipation rates. Finally, our paper also sheds light on the classical question in the literature on contest design: Whether it pays o¤ to provide intermediate feedback to contestants in a dynamic contest? It should be noted that a (partially) simultaneous temporal structure can be equivalently interpreted as one without or with limited intermediate feedback. Under such a feedback system, players cannot perfectly observe the history of past plays. Our analysis, however, shows that feedback or disclosure policy does not impact the performance of the contest.
Extensions
Our baseline analysis is executed in fairly general setting, and the main insights rely little on the setup. This framework leaves open a number of possible extensions. The analysis in our baseline setting also yields useful implications to further work. In this part, we discuss a few possible extensions. We demonstrate the generality and versatility of the main logic of our analysis. The discussion also allows us to ascertain and test the limit of the results in alternative contexts.
Unequal "Finish Line"
One straightforward extension is to allow one team to be endowed with a headstart, such that it can win the contest by accumulating a smaller number of victories in component battles. Without loss of generality, we assume that team 1 is the favorite, and it wins the …rst-past-post contest by securing k victories before team 2 wins l, with k < l. For instance, in an R&D race towards a …nal product, one …rm may have secured patents on a few critical component technologies, to which the other has no access.
Our analysis does not lose its bite in this context. When one team has a headstart, the race can be viewed as a subcontest of the "best-of-(2n + 1)"contest in which one team has accumulated a larger number of victories from prior battles. The headstart would not a¤ect the prediction from the current model.
Unequally Weighed Battles
Another direct extension is to allow component battles to carry di¤erent weights for teams' wins. To be more speci…c, let each contest include s 3 component battles, which are carried out successively. A team is awarded a score y i t if its player wins battle t, which can be heterogenous across teams. A team wins the entire contest if and only if either (1) its accumulated scores reaches a given cuto¤ before the rival team touches its …nish line, or (2) it obtains a higher accumulated score than the rival, while either touches the …nish lines after all s battles have been contested.
The setting allows each battle matters di¤erently in the entire contest, i.e., y 
Analogous to the baseline setting, each battle would be common-valued static contest, and its winner would be picked in an independent draw. Although winning a battle moves one team towards the eventual victory by a di¤erent margin than it does the other, one team's one step further towards the …nish line implies the other team's being pulled away from the …nish line by a step of the same size. The symmetry highlighted by Theorem 1 persists.
In conclusion, this extension does not change the stochastic outcome of each battle, as well as that of the entire contest. The same trade-o¤s and strategic mindset persist in the alternative setting, although the exact formula for e¤ective prize spread and expected e¤ort must be computed quantitatively di¤erently.
Asymmetric Valuations
In our baseline analysis, we assume that all players equally value the team prize. We now relax this assumption. Assume that each player i(t)'s valuation of the team prize ! i(t) is a random draw according to a continuous distribution function F i(t) (! i(t) ). We continue to allow for all possible information structures, such that the realization of ! i(t) may or may not be known to player j(t). We normalize each player's marginal e¤ort cost to one.
We assume …rst that players do not derive private bene…t from winning their own battles. Suppose that the contest is currently in a state (k; l) with k; l < n+1. We continue to denote by p i (k; l) a team i's winning likelihood assessed when the contest is in a state (k; l). Then player 1(t) maximizes
A similar argument to Lemma 1 can be invoked here. Because p 2 (k; l+1) = 1 p 1 (k; l+1) and p 2 (k + 1; l) = 1 p 1 (k + 1; l), the e¤ective prize spread for player 2(t) is rewritten as
Hence, we can conclude that in an arbitrary battle t, a player i(t) have an e¤ective prize spread [p 1 (k + 1; l) p 1 (k; l + 1)]! i(t) . The coe¢ cient [p 1 (k + 1; l) p 1 (k; l + 1)] is determined by the state of the contest, but it is symmetric across matched players. Hence, the change in the state of the contest would scale up or down matched players'valuations of the win by the same factor. The ratio of players'e¤ective prize spread, i.e.,
, remains constant regardless. Standard argument in contest or auction literature allows us to conclude that each battle has a stochastic outcome ( t ; 1 t ), which is pre-determined by the characteristics of players'prize valuations. It does not depend on the history of past battles, and the winner of each battle is independently drawn. The entire set of results in our baseline analysis will be preserved in the alternative setting.
However, history of plays would cause distortion to the extent that players derive private bene…t from winning their own battles. Let i(t) be a player i(t)'s private reward for winning the battle, regardless of his team's win or less. In this case, a player i(t)'s e¤ective prize spread would become i(t) + [p 1 (k + 1; l) p 1 (k; l + 1)]! i(t) . The expected payo¤ from team prize is still scaled up or down by the same factor, i.e., [p 1 (k + 1; l) p 1 (k; l + 1)], across the two players. The change in state, however, does not a¤ect the private prize i(t) . In this case, the stochastic outcome of a battle would depend on the state of the contest when the battle is being carried out, as it a¤ects the ratio of the two players'e¤ective prize spread, i.e.,
. The winner of each battle would not be independently drawn. However, it should be noted that the simultaneous ‡uctuation in expected team prize still o¤sets the externality between battles to varying degree, depending on the particulars of the contest. The distortion caused by history of plays tends to be less signi…cant than that in a contest between individuals. The results would be qualitatively more robust especially when the value of private bene…t is relatively small. A complete analysis of this extension goes beyond the scope of this study. However, it is worth serious research e¤ort and will be attempted by the authors in future work.
Non-deterministic Winner Selection Mechanisms
The baseline analysis focuses on a contest with deterministic winner selection mechanism, i.e., one wins with certainty if his e¤ort exceeds that of his rival. In this part, we consider an extension in which the winner selection mechanism includes noisy factors, such that the player who contributes more e¤ort may not win.
We begin the discussion with the most popularly adopted Tullock contest success function (see, for example, Klumpp and Polborn, 2006) . Under this setting, a player i(t) has a winning probability
with r t 2 (0; 1). When r t approaches in…nitely, the Tullock contest converges into an all-pay auction. This contest success function is axiomatized by Skaperdas 1996 and Clark and Riis 1998. Fu and Lu (2012) paves it a micro foundation in a noisy-ranking approach. Assume for tractability that the realizations of players'marginal e¤ort costs are commonly known. 7 The result stated in Theorem 1 does not depend on the prevailing winner selection mechanism. Each battle continues to be a common-value one-shot contest. With Tullock contest technology, a player's winning probability purely depends on the ratio between players'marginal cost. This result is well known for contests with small r, in which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. For brevity, we omit the proof for this statement in a setting with large r, but it is available from the authors upon request. As a result, the entire set of results we obtain from the all-pay auction setting would continue to hold.
To put it more generally, our results remain robust when the winner selection mechanism is homogenous of degree zero, i.e., p i(t) (x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ) = p i(t) ( x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ), with > 0. Both Tullock contest, and its limiting case of all-pay auction, demonstrate this property.
However, additional caution is needed when the winner selection mechanism does not satisfy this requirement. For instance, let a player i(t)'s winning probability take the following form:
with f ( ) to be continuous and strictly increasing. Assume that f ( ) is concave, such that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. In a common-value one-shot contest with a prize v, the equilibrium is determined by
7 It should be noted that Tullock contest model has limited tractability when the success function becomes excessively elastic, i.e., when r is large. Due to the technical di¢ culty, the analysis on Tullock contest remains incomplete. Alcade and Dahm (2010) and Wang (2010) demonstrate the existence of all-pay auction equilibrium in Tullock contest with large r under complete-information settings. The equilibrium behavior of a Tullock contest with large r and incomplete information has yet to be characterized in the literature.
The ultimate winning probability
is independent of v if and only if f (x) = ax r , with a > 0 (see Clark and Riis, 1996) . To the extent that this property is absent, externalities among battles arise. In that case, the stochastic outcome of a battle depends on the exact value of the e¤ective prize spread, which is apparently state-dependent. However, recall again that Theorem 1 holds regardless of the prevailing contest technologies. The balancing force it exercises remains in place to varying degree. It would continue to partially o¤set the externality between battles, and counteract (partially) the distortion caused by history of plays.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to be pointed out that our results in symmetric contests would not be a¤ected by winner selection mechanism. Consider a symmetric contest in which all battles are contested between equally competent players. Suppose that the contest technology of each battle allows for a symmetric equilibrium, which, for instance, is feasible under ratio-form contest success function (16) with regularly-behaved production function f ( ). In this case, the winner of each battle would be picked in an independent and fair draw, with each to win with a probability of exactly 1 2 . The distortion caused by history of plays on the outcomes of the contest is again fully o¤set. To put it di¤erently, it can be inferred that the history-independence principle we establish in all-pay-auction setting tends to be qualitatively more robust in a context where rival players are more closely matched in terms of their competence.
Despite the independence in terms of winner selection mechanisms, history of plays would still a¤ect the e¤ort supply in the contest. It remains curious how battles between …xed pairs of players should be ordered in a sequence, under various contest technologies. The problem is technically challenging, while a full solution is expected to generate rich implications on contest design. These extensions will be explored by the authors in future e¤orts.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study multi-battle-contest between two teams. The contest is comprised of a series of pairwise battle fought between matched players from rival teams. We demonstrate in an all-pay-auction setting that the well-studied "discouragement e¤ect"in individual multibattle contests do not appear. The history of plays in the sequential contest does not cause distortion to the stochastic outcomes of future battles. In addition, the expected e¤ort of the contest is independent of the temporal structure of the contest, i.e., the sequencing or clustering of component battles. These results yield rich implications for policy experimentation and contest design.
The present paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on multi-battle contests by introducing a setting that involves collective actions. Team competitions, as stated in In-troduction, are pervasive in real world, while it has been rarely studied in way of formal modelling. Our analysis unveils the fundamental di¤erence in players' strategic mindsets between individual contests and team contests.
Our analysis is one of the early steps towards a complete understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. As discussed in Section 5, the framework leaves open a tremendous room for many extensions. These variations would introduce a wide array of new elements that enrich the strategic interactions in the game and uncover other forces involved in the trade-o¤s players face in team competitions. They all deserve to be explored more comprehensively. As we have demonstrated, the main logic of our baseline analysis extends beyond the current setting, and it. Our technical results, as implied by our discussion on extensions, would also be useful in analyzing team contests in alternative settings.
In addition to them, the framework can be extended in many other directions. In our baseline analysis, we assume that players' e¤ort costs are independently distributed. One interesting but technically challenging extension is to allow players'cost distributions involve team-speci…c characteristics, i.e., the costs of players from the same teams have a¢ liated distributions. For instance, players of a tennis team often join training camps before major tournaments. The joint training program a¤ects the performance of all players in a team. In that case, the team contest would involve strategic information updating as players of later rounds would infer the competence levels of their rivals by observing the past plays. Alternatively, a player's performance and incentives can be perturbed by various behavioral factors. For instance, a player may use his teammates'performance as a reference to set his own expectations: He can be pressurized when teammates perform well, or can be relieved of pressure otherwise. Team contests provide an interesting context in which we can introduce such peer e¤ects into formal modelling. These extensions, among many others, would give rise to substantially more extensive strategic interaction, and broaden the scope of this framework. They deserve to be studied seriously, and will be attempted by the authors in future. In addition, this paper generates a number of testable hypotheses. The theoretical predictions have yet to be tested either in …eld or in laboratory to test their limit and to identify other factors that could be involved in the strategic trade-o¤s of players. An experimental study is in progress to shed light on economic agents'behavior in multi-battle team contest.
Altogether, the analysis is conducted in three cases. , while contesant 2 simply ends up with zero expected payo¤. The equilibrium can be characterized by the following equations:
Hence, their equilibrium mixed strategies are F 2 (x 2 ) = (1
; and
. In the equilibrium, contestant 2 wins with a probability
: Apparently, the expected e¤ort is also linear in v, and the coe¢ cienct is a function of (c 1 ; c 2 ) 
with boundary conditions i (0) = c i ; i = 1; 2. i (b); i = 1; 2 can be pinned down starting from b 0 = 0. As the slopes are known from (13) and (14) at b 0 = 0, i (b) can be pinned at a higher b 1 :Then the slopes at b 1 can be pinned down, and we can move to a higher b 2 . Clearly, i ( ); i = 1; 2 determined by (13) and (14) (13) and (14) with boundary conditions i (0) = c i ; i = 1; 2.
Extend the support of f j (c j ) to allow c j < c j , and de…ne f j (c j ) = f j (c j ), 8c j < c j . 8ĉ j 2 [c j ; c j ], consider i ( ); i = 1; 2 determined by (13) and (14) with boundary conditions
Clearly, b(ĉ j ) is continuous, and (ĉ j ) is also continuous. In addition, whenĉ j = c j , we have (c j ) > c j . Whenĉ j = c j , we have (c j ) < c j . Therefore, there must existĉ j 2 (c j ; c j ) such that (ĉ j ) = j ( b(ĉ j )) = c j . De…ne c j =ĉ j and b = b(c j ). By de…nition, we have (13) and (14) We are now ready to characterize the bidding equilibrium. In a winner-take-all all pay auction with two bidders who are privately endowed with information about their bidding costs, we derive the bidding equilibrium. We assume a tie-breaking rule which favors the stronger bidder i.
Bidder 
For stronger bidder i of type c i 2 [c i ;ĉ i ] chooses b i to maximize his expected payo¤:
The …rst order condition is given by:
For weak bidder j, de…ne
For weak bidder j of type c j 2 [c j ; c j ] chooses b j 0 to maximize his expected payo¤:
Solving b i (c i ); i = 1; 2 is equivalent to solving for ' i (b); i = 1; 2. (16) and (17) can be rewritten as
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j;
with boundary conditions ' i (0) = c i ; i = 1; 2:Clearly, i ( ); i = 1; 2 determined by (13) and (14) with boundary conditions i (0) = c i = c i ;and j (0) = c j must satisfy (18) . In addition, . We need to show that they satisfỹ
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j; This is,
This reduces to
which is the same as (18), i.e., '
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j: Proof. In this case, we assume without loss of generality that player 1's bidding cost, c 1 > 0, is common knowledge, while player 2's cost, c 2 , is privately known to himself. Let c 2 be continuously distributed over an interval [c; c]. The distribution of c 2 , F (c 2 ), is commonly known. This all-pay auction is in principle similar to the one-sided asymmetric contest proposed and studied by Morath and Münster (2010) . The following proof adopts a similar approach to that of Morath and Münster (2010) .
We de…ne B i (x i ) as the ex ante bid distribution of player i. The function must demonstrate the following properties:
P1: B i ( ) is atomless above zero. P2: The distribution of bids must have the same supports, and the lower support is zero. P3: min(B 1 (0); B 2 (0)) = 0. P4: B i ( ) is strictly increasing, 8i 2 f1; 2g. These properties are all standard in auction and contest games. We verify them brie ‡y. We …rst verify the claim of P1. Suppose for contrary that B i (x i ) has a positive probability mass atx > 0. It implies that player j's expected payo¤ function has an upward jump at x. Player i would strictly gain by choosing e¤ort in some -neighborhood abovex to e¤ort in an "-neighborhood belowx. That is, player i would not bid x i 2 (x ";x]. Given that, player j would not place positive probability mass atx.
We then verify P2. We …rst argue that they have the same upper support b. Given that one player's bid is bounded by b, the other player has no incentive to bid more that, because an e¤ort b allows him to win with probability one. We then argue that they have the same lower support b. Suppose for contrary that one player i's minimum bid b i > b. Then player j has no incentive to exert an e¤ort x j 2 (b; b i ]. We then argue b = 0. Suppose for contrary b > 0. Then a player i would prefer simply bidding zero to bidding x i in a "-neighborhood above b. Contradiction results.
We continue to verify P3. Suppose for contrary that both B 1 (0) and B 2 (0) are positive. Given B j (0) > 0, player i strictly prefers bidding x i within a "-neighborhood above zero to zero. Contradiction results.
We again de…ne the player i with B i (0) > 0 to be the "weaker player", and the other to be the "stronger bidder". We assume that in the zero probability event that x 1 = x 2 = 0, the stronger bidder is favored under the tie-breaking rule.
We …nally verify P4. Suppose for contrary that there exists an interval (x; x) over which B i ( ) does not strictly increase with B i (x) = B i ( x) and B i (x) > B i ( x) for x > x. It implies that player i does have a bid over this interval. Hence, for player j, an e¤ort x must be strictly preferable to any bid within this interval, also that within an "-neighborhood above x. That is, player j does not bid x j 2 (x; x + "). Given that, player i would not bid an e¤ort with the "-neighborhood above x. It thus contradicts with the fact of
We then claim that players have the following strategies. Player 1 has a mixed-bidding strategy, which is depicted by a distribution function B 1 (x 1 ). Player 2 plays a pure bidding strategy b(c 2 ), which is mapping b : [c; c] ! R + . Player 2 may stop placing positive bid if c 2 exceeds a thresholdĉ. The bidding function b(c 2 ) is continuous and di¤erentiable over for c 2 2 [c;ĉ]. It is also strictly decreasing over this interval.
We now verify that player 2 does not randomize his bid while player 2 has a pure strategy. Suppose for the contrary. Let x(c) and x(c) be the upper and lower supports of the e¤ort bidding strategy of a player 2 with e¤ort cost c, respectively, with x(c) > x(c). By bidding x(c), his payo¤ is B 1 (x(c))v cx(c). If his bidding strategy involves a bid x > x(c), the payo¤ requires
Alternatively, if the bidding strategy involves a bid x 0 < x(c), the payo¤ requires
We then consider a player 2 of type c 0 > c. A player of this type will strictly prefer bidding x(c) to bidding x > x(c):
hold. Hence, we can conclude that x(c 0 ) x(c). We then consider a player of type c 00 < c.
A player of this type will strictly prefer bidding x(c) to bidding x 0 > x(c): In this case,
Hence, we can conclude that x(c 00 ) x(c).
As a result, we see that only type c's strategy may involve a bid in the interval (x(c); x(c)). Because players'types are continuously distributed, B 2 ( ) cannot be strictly increasing over the interval (x(c); x(c)). Contradiction results. We then verify that player 1 does not play a pure strategy. Suppose …rst the contrary that player 1 bids zero with probability one. Then player 2 would win with certainty by an e¤ort ". Then player 1 would place positive e¤ort instead. Contradiction. We then suppose that player 1 bids a positive e¤ort x with probability one. First assume x = v c . Then player 2 of all types would give up by bidding zero. In response, player 1 would not place that e¤ort with probability one. We then assume x < v c
. Then player 2 of all types c <c would place an e¤ort x + ". Apparently, it cannot be a part of the equilibrium.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium. We …rst consider player 1. His expected payo¤ when bidding x 1 is given by
As player 1 randomizes over his bids, the equilibrium must satis…es the …rst order condition
for all x 1 2 [0; b]. A solution to the di¤erential equation must have
Let us de…ne 2 v d. The threshold for player 2's exit would exist if F 1 ( 2 ) < c.
We now turn to player 2. By placing a bid x 2 , his payo¤ is given by
The equilibrium must satisfy B
By results obtained above, it is further rewritten as
which leads to
What remains is to determine 1 and 2 . Recall that B 1 ( ) and B 2 ( ) have the same support. It requires
Further recall that it is impossible to have both B 1 ( ) and B 2 ( ) have positive probability mass at zero bid. B 2 ( ) has a positive probability mass if and only if F 1 ( 2 ) < c. In that case, 1 = 0, and 2 is the solution to the equation
If F 1 ( 2 ) c, B 2 ( ) has no probability mass at zero. Then 1 is the solution to the equation
Apparently, neither 1 nor 2 depends on v.
To further understand that, rewrite (10) as v. As a result, player 1's winning probability by bidding x 1 would be the same as that in the original contest where he bids
What remains is to show player 1's bidding strategyB 1 ( x 1 ) in the alternative contest satis…esB 1 ( x 1 ) = B 1 (x 1 ). The probability of player 1's bid falling below an arbitrary level x 1 is given byB
, which demonstrates homogeneity of degree zero. That is, he places each bid x 1 with the same probability as he does x 1 in the original contest. In conclusion, the ex ante winning likelihood of either player does not depend on v.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Suppose that the contest is in a state (k; l), and a total of t 1 battles have been carried out, with t 1 k + l. Further assume that the upcoming battle t is nontrivial, i.e., k; l < n + 1. Because we normalize the team prize to one, the continuation value v 1 (k; l) is in fact equivalent to the probability of team 1 winning the contest assessed at a state (k; l), i.e. v 1 (k; l) = p 1 (k; l). Team 1 may win the contest in any of n l + 1 terminal states: f(n + 1; l), (n + 1; l + 1); : : : ; (n + 1; n)g. From a state (k; l), players of team 1 needs to win another n + 1 k battles, while allowing those of team 2 to win no more than n l battles.
Let Pr( (n + 1; l 0 )j (k; l)) denote the conditional probability of team 1's winning the contest in a terminal state (2n+1; l 0 ), with l 0 2 fl; : : : ; ng, when the contest is currently in a state (k; l). The continuation value v 1 (k; l) can be simply written as v 1 (k; l) P n l 0 =l Pr((n + 1; l 0 )j (k; l)).
The probability Pr( (n + 1; l)j (k; l)), i.e., that of team 1's winning the next n + 1 k battles consecutively, is simply given by 1 (n + 1 kj n + 1 k)j t+n k t . The probability of its closing the team contest in a terminal state (n+1; l+1) is given by 1 (n + 1 kj n + 2 k)j
. It should be noted that 1 (n + 1 kj n + 2 k)j t+n+1 k t is the probability of the event that team 1 wins any n+1 k battles in battles t to t+n+1 k.
To compute the probability of the team contest ending in state (n + 1; l + 1), we have to exclude from it the probability of the event that team 1 wins all battles in battles t to t + n k, but loses battle t + n + 1 k. By the same token, the probability of the team contest ending in a terminal state (n+1; l+ 2) is given by 1 (n + 1 kj n + 3 k)j t+n+2 k t (1 t+n+2 k ) 1 (n + 1 kj n + 2 k)j t+n+1 k t . We sum them up, and obtain the formula stated in Theorem 3.
Proof. The following fact must hold:
By Theorem 3, we must have
The following facts must hold:
Fact 2 1 (n + 1 kj m)j
. 
Fact 1 leads to
We match the ith item of the series f[ t+m 1 (n + 1 kj m) We then conclude v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1) = v 1 (k; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. From (11), we have E(x t ) = P t 1 k=0 Pr( (k; l)j t)E(x i(t) (k; l)) = P t 1 k=0 fPr( (k; l)j t) t [ t + v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)]g = t ( P t 1 k=0 Pr((k; l)j t) t + P t 1 k=0 Pr((k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)]
It should be noted that P t 1 k=0 Pr((k; l)j t) boils down to one. Hence, (12) reduces to E(x t ) = t t + t P t 1 k=0 Pr((k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)]:
By Theorem 4, we must have, for k; l n, min(k; l) < n.
Pr( (k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)]
If max(k; l) n + 1; Pr( (k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)] boils down to zero, in which case team 1 has won. If t > n + 1, and t 1 k > n + 1, Pr((k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)] also boils down to zero, in which case team 2 has won.
In the knife-edge case of t = 2n + 1 and k = l = n, Pr((k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)] is simply given by 1 (nj 2n)j 2n 1 , with t = k + l + 1. Hence, we must have E(x t ) = t t + t P n k=0 Pr((k; l)j t)[v 1 (k + 1; l) v 1 (k; l + 1)] = t t + t P n k=0 1 (kj k + l)j = t t + t 1 (nj 2n)j t :
where 1 (nj 2n)j t is the overall probability of team 1's winning exactly n out of the 2n battles, excluding battle t. Because the history-independence result of Theorem 2, the outcome of each of the 2n battles is an independent draw. Reordering these battles does not change 1 (nj 2n)j t 0 6 =t . Apparently, neither t nor t depends on the order, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. The case of max(k; l) n + 1 is trivial. So we focus on the case of k; l < n + 1. Let #z be the number of battles included in a cluster z. We consider …rst the last cluster z that contains more than one battle. Without loss of generality, let t be the battle with smallest index in the cluster. Aparently, the stochastic outcomes of battles subsequent to those in this cluster, which are not clustered, will not be a¤ected by previous outcomes either (by Theorem 2). The win probability of other battles in the same cluster does not depend on battle t's outcome either. Let i(t) (x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ) be the probability of player i(t)'s winning the battle for a given e¤ort pro…le (x 1(t) ; x 2(t) ).
In this case, a player 1(t) receives t if he wins. If he wins, the contest may enter any state (k + 1 + g; l + #z 1 g), with g 2 f0; : : : ; #z 1g, after all the battles in z are fought. If he loses, then the contest may enter any sate (k + g; l + #z g), with g 2 f0; : : : ; #z 1g, after all the battles in z are fought. As a result, his e¤ective spread amounts to 
where~ 1 (gj #z 1)
is the probability of the event that team 1 wins g out of the #z 1 simultaneous battles in cluster z, excluding battle t. We then have (42) We apply Lemma 1, and obtain that the two players must have (43) = (44). It implies that all battles in z are common-valued, and each battle t 0 in this cluster has a stochastic outcome ( t 0 ; 1 t 0 ), which is purely determined by matched players'cost conditions. Hence, .
We further consider the sum in (43). Recall v 1 (k + 1 + g; l + #z 1 g) v 1 (k + g; l + #z g) = 1 ( (n + 1) (k + 1 + g)j 2n + 1 (t + #z 1))j 2n+1 t+#z if k + g; l + #z 1 g < n + 1, and it boils down to zero otherwise. Hence, the sum is rewritten as min((#z 1;n k) P g=max(0;l+#z 1 n) n 1 (n (k + g)j 2n + 1 (t + #z 1))j 2n+1 t+#z 1 (gj #z 1)j
Apparently, all battles in z are no di¤erent from each other as they are fought simultaneously. The e¤ective prize spread for an arbitrary battle t 0 can be written as t + 1 (n kj 2n k l)j t 0 ;>k+l , where 1 (n kj 2n k l)j t 0 ;>k+l is the probability of team 1 winning exactly n k out of the 2n k l battles after the contest enters the state (k; l), excluding battle t 0 .
We can then move back to the immediately preceding cluster. Suppose that the cluster contains more than one battle. Consider an arbitrary battle t in the cluster. The stochastic outcomes of battles subsequent to those in the cluster do not depend on the outcomes of the battles in this cluster. Hence, we can repeat the above exercise. For a given state (k; l), we conclude that the e¤ective prize spread for players i(t), i = 1; 2, is given by t + 1 (n kj 2n k l)j t;>k+l . Again, the stochastic outcome of a battle t in the cluster is predetermined by players'cost conditions, which is given by ( t ; 1 t ). If the cluster contains only one battle, the analysis would be trivial. The same exercises can be repeated to analyze all preceding clusters. It can be concluded that all battle's winner is picked in an independent draw, with a stochastic outcome of ( t ; 1
